

## Investors' perspectives on financial reporting

On October 7, 2011, members of the Audit Committee Leadership Network (ACLN) met in New York to discuss investors' perspectives on financial reporting, among other topics.<sup>1</sup> They were joined by Gary Buesser, director, Lazard Asset Management, and Greg Jonas, managing director, Morgan Stanley. This document provides a summary of the key points that members raised in the discussion, along with background information and perspectives that members shared before the meeting.<sup>2</sup> For further information about the network, see "About this document" on page 9. For biographies of Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas, see Appendix 1 on page 10. For a list of participants, see Appendix 2 on page 11. For a list of discussion questions for audit committees, see Appendix 3 on page 12.

### Executive summary

Financial reporting<sup>3</sup> is a challenging issue for audit committee members and investors alike. In a complex and dynamic economic environment, the types of information investors need in order to understand and value companies is continually evolving, yet companies' financial reports may not fully meet those needs. To discuss this issue, members met with Mr. Buesser, a buy-side analyst, and Mr. Jonas, a sell-side analyst. For more information about the distinct roles of these analysts, see the text box on page 8. Outcomes of the dialogue included the following:

- **Investors call for improvements to audited financial information** (*page 2*)

Audited financial statements are a critical foundation for analysts, providing reliable data that is independently verified. However, they have limitations, including their retrospective nature and the fact that companies often treat them as a compliance exercise, not a communication tool for investors. Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas called for improvements to audited information, such as enhanced reporting of cash flow, and suggested that auditors provide more information to investors.

- **Investors increasingly value non-audited information and say it could be improved** (*page 4*)

Members and guests agreed that investors and analysts are increasingly valuing the non-audited information, including what is provided in analysts' presentations, roadshows, and the management discussion and analysis (MD&A). Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas suggested that information and data in these sources, such as key performance indicators (KPIs) and other non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) measures, could be of higher quality and that guidance could be more useful to investors. They also said that auditing this information would be valuable to investors.

<sup>1</sup> In another session, members discussed how to address audit committee overload. See Audit Committee Leadership Network, "[Addressing audit committee overload](#)," *ViewPoints*, November 3, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> *ViewPoints* reflects the network's use of a modified version of the Chatham House Rule whereby names of members and guests and their company affiliations are a matter of public record, but comments made before and during meetings are not attributed to individuals or corporations. Member and guests quotes appear in italics.

<sup>3</sup> For the purposes of this discussion, 'financial reporting' includes audited financial statements, press releases, analysts' presentations, and other supplemental information (financial and non-financial in nature) that the company provides to shareholders and the public.

▪ **Audit chairs can help their companies communicate a cohesive story to investors** (page 6)

While companies provide a great deal of valuable information to investors, what investors really want is a cohesive story about the company that ties together the disparate data points. Audit chairs can help their companies provide this by ensuring that communications offer a consistent message, that they provide insight into how the company is addressing key economic or regulatory debates, and that management – including the CFO and investor relations – communicates effectively. In the case of reporting problems, investors highly value the opportunity to speak directly to the audit chair.

**Investors call for improvements to audited financial information**

The question of how to improve financial reporting is perennial, engaging many stakeholders including standards setters, regulators, issuers, and auditors. As part of the effort to converge the world's dominant accounting standards, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) are co-developing a project on financial statement presentation,<sup>4</sup> and the FASB is developing a disclosure framework intended to make financial disclosures more effective, coordinated, and integrated with other parts of a company's reporting.<sup>5</sup> In the wake of the financial crisis, regulatory initiatives have focused on expanding disclosures for investors; for example, new SEC disclosure requirements include proxy disclosure enhancements involving risk oversight, director qualifications, and compensation.<sup>6</sup>

**Audited financial statements are essential to investors**

Speaking at the ACLN meeting, Mr. Buesser said, *"The audited financial statements are the foundation of our work."* Analysts and investors use the information in the audited financials to build models for tracking business performance, and highly value the fact that it is independently verified and generally consistent between periods and across companies.<sup>7</sup> Mr. Jonas highlighted the value of audited information as an important counterbalance to management's natural exuberance and optimistic bias, a deterrent to fraudulent reporting, a means of ensuring compliance with standards, and a promoter of internal controls. He added, *"We spend a lot of time looking at the 10Qs and 10Ks."*

Analysts and other financial stakeholders, such as preparers, believe that this information has improved considerably over the last 10–15 years.<sup>8</sup> Mr. Jonas explained, *"Over the last decade, the quality and discipline of financial reporting has improved significantly. Restatements for errors are down dramatically, particularly for the larger companies, and the market effect of them is less. The data has integrity. Ten years ago, that wasn't true. There has been tremendous investment in the financial reporting infrastructure. I think things are better today, in terms of reliability."* Accounting standards have also improved in several

<sup>4</sup> ["Project Update: Financial Statement Presentation – Joint Project of the FASB and IASB."](#) Financial Accounting Standards Board, last modified May 3, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> ["Project Update: Disclosure Framework."](#) Financial Accounting Standards Board, last modified September 9, 2011.

<sup>6</sup> Securities and Exchange Commission, [Proxy Disclosure Enhancements](#) (Washington, DC: Securities and Exchange Commission, 2009).

<sup>7</sup> Ernst & Young and Tapestry Networks, ["The Financial Communication Challenge."](#) *InSights*, November 2009, 4.

<sup>8</sup> [Ibid.](#), 4.

areas, including pensions, consolidation, restructuring, derivatives, revenue recognition, and discipline over fair value information.<sup>9</sup>

## Audited financials have limitations

Despite their clear value, however, audited financial statements have limitations for investors' purposes:

- **They offer a retrospective view.** Audited financials are inherently retrospective, yet analysts want to understand where a company is going next. Mr. Jonas said, *"We are trying to understand as much as possible in order to predict the future ... However, the metrics in the financial disclosures are not responsive to the ebb and flow of issues driving prices and risk – it's a uniform, static data set."*
- **Filings are treated as a compliance exercise, not a communication tool for investors.** Mr. Jonas said, *"Companies are missing an opportunity by not having the Qs and Ks communicate to the market."* In response, one audit chair explained that the compliance and legal environment stops companies: *"The Ks and Qs are full of legal obligations. At [our company] we have three sets of outside lawyers reviewing everything. So the opportunity to be creative is constrained, to say the least. We use analyst meetings and other public forums for this communication. It's not a desire to make the reports less useful – it's the legal environment."* Mr. Jonas and Mr. Buesser expressed surprise at the widely held view among the audit chairs that lawyers and SEC requirements are restricting companies from communicating more effectively in their filings.

## Data in the audited financials could be more useful to investors

Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas outlined several improvements they would like to see in companies' audited financial reports:

- **Enhanced reporting of cash flow.** A member commented, *"Whereas a few years ago, investors hoped accounting standards would help, investors now realize that the attempt to attribute fair value to activities in accounting standards has made it harder to work out their own valuations. So they have gone back to basics – just tell me about cash flows, and then I will, using my models, turn that into valuations."* Mr. Buesser agreed, *"We value the company by looking at sustainable operating cash flow. This is the most valuable to us."* Mr. Jonas suggested three ways to enhance the reporting of cash flow: first, report cash flow by segment; second, use the accrual method on the capital expenditure line (which should include the effect of non-cash transactions, such as leasing activities); and third, disclose the cash effects of unusual and non-recurring items.
- **More disaggregation of information.** Analysts want more detail and explanation regarding various reported items, such as revenues and off-balance-sheet entities. One of the core principles of the IASB and the FASB project on financial statement presentation is disaggregation. Mr. Buesser said, *"It is helpful to explain what different businesses are doing in different markets. Disaggregate by geography and sector and do not lump it together. Breaking it out is very valuable."*

<sup>9</sup> Greg Jonas, "Sell-Side Analysts, Fundamental Analysis and Financial Reporting," slide presentation for an education session with US Securities and Exchange Commission staff, August 11, 2011.

- **More information about how revenue is created.** Mr. Jonas said, *“In most businesses, revenues and customer acceptance determines company performance. So, predicting revenues preoccupies investors’ thinking. Yet, how much of the financial report is devoted to how revenue is created? Not much. The reporting model requires extensive reporting about costs – pensions, taxes, parts of costs of sales, advertizing, R&D, etc. – but, on the drivers of the company’s future, there is not enough information.”*
- **More insight on tax in multinational companies.** Mr. Buesser said, *“When tax rates are low, I want a better understanding of whether the tax rate is sustainable.”*

### Investors would like more information from the auditor

The issue of how to make the auditor’s report more informative has recently been taken up by both the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and the European Commission. In its June concept release on the auditor’s reporting model, the PCAOB discussed potential changes to the auditor’s report, including the addition of an auditor’s discussion and analysis, and expanded use of emphasis paragraphs.<sup>10</sup> Both Mr. Jonas and Mr. Buesser were in favor of expanding the insight auditors provide to investors in their reports, saying it *“makes a ton of sense.”* However, members voiced concern over what this could entail. For example, disclosing information about the content of the discussions between the audit committee and the external auditor could reduce or alter the nature of this important dialogue.

### Investors increasingly value non-audited information and say it could be improved

Several ACLN members agreed with their colleague who said, *“My experience is that investors want to know about management and the strategy, which are not always apparent in the numbers.”* Another member noted, *“Most sophisticated investors are working off non-GAAP numbers anyhow.”*

Analysts gather non-audited information from a variety of company sources, including management speeches, press releases, road shows, and conference calls, and from the non-audited portion of financial reports, such as the MD&A.

### Non-GAAP measures are extremely valuable, but companies could use them more effectively

Non-GAAP and operational metrics, such as average revenue per user or customer acquisition cost, are highly valuable to analysts.<sup>11</sup> Mr. Jonas said, *“Material in the fact books is really important. KPIs are often a combination of an operating and financial measure. They are very important.”* Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas called for two improvements in the use of non-GAAP metrics:

- **More consistency and comparability of KPIs.** Mr. Buesser explained the challenge of comparability with non-audited metrics: *“It is difficult to rely on KPIs or non-audited metrics that come from different sources. For example, some companies in an industry may use one source of data for KPIs, such as chemical plant cost curves, while other companies in the industry use another source for this data.”* In fact, analysts must convert certain metrics in order to make them comparable and usable in their models.

<sup>10</sup> Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, [Concept Release on Possible Revisions to PCAOB Standards Relating to Reports on Audited Financial Statements](#) (Washington, DC: Public Accounting Oversight Board, 2011), 2.

<sup>11</sup> Ernst & Young and Tapestry Networks, [“The Financial Communication Challenge.”](#) 8.

With analysts placing more importance on KPIs, Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas advocated for audit committee members to increase scrutiny of their companies' use of these metrics. For example, the audit committee could look more closely at this information, perhaps working with management to identify a few of the most critical indicators and then reviewing how they are communicated.

- **Better quality of non-GAAP measures related to consensus earnings.** Because sell-side analysts want to participate in consensus earnings,<sup>12</sup> they are pressured to use the non-GAAP measures adopted by data aggregators. Data aggregators, however, sometimes adopt metrics presented by management that analysts believe are of lower quality. Mr. Buesser said, *“Some management teams are becoming more aggressive with their use of creative non-GAAP measures. Sophisticated analysts understand this and make their own adjustments. But because there is no feasible alternative to sell-side consensus earnings, these metrics are used by data aggregators, therefore leading management to believe they are useful.”* Mr. Buesser went on to encourage audit chairs to ensure their companies *“...don't put out pro-forma numbers that include pro-forma exclusions that are recurring with cash flow implications, such as restructuring expenses.”*

#### Forecasts and guidance may not be valuable, particularly if in a wide earnings-per-share (EPS) range

Management's forecasts of company performance provide a benchmark against which analysts can compare their own models. Mr. Jonas said, *“Guidance is essentially helping people understand how a company's business model performs under various economic conditions.”*

However, guidance may be unhelpful in some formats and for some analysts' purposes. Mr. Buesser said, *“Realistic guidance will be utilized by analysts in their models, however, guidance with a wide range, for example, an EPS estimate range between \$1.50 to \$1.75 per share, or guidance that is consistently conservative, is not useful for analysts.”* Still, forecasts do provide analysts with a measure (once their accuracy is known) of management's understanding of the business.<sup>13</sup>

Audit chairs reflected upon the challenges of working with management to determine the best approach to issuing guidance. One audit chair said, *“I have one CFO saying, ‘I'll never go back to giving EPS guidance again.’ As audit chairs, how should we council management on guidance?”* Mr. Buesser responded, *“If you provide me with an analysis about what impacts your business model, I can make my own forecasts.”*

Research for *InSights* found that in cases where the decision is made to eliminate guidance, the audit committee should encourage management to provide alternative metrics so that analysts and investors can develop their own forecasts.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> “Consensus earnings” are averages of analyst predictions calculated and published by data aggregators. To be included in consensus earnings, analysts must submit predictions consistent with consensus methodology. Being included is desirable to analysts because it is a form of publicity.

<sup>13</sup> Ernst & Young and Tapestry Networks, [“The Financial Communication Challenge.”](#) 8.

<sup>14</sup> [Ibid.](#), 12.

## Investors say they would value an expanded audit scope

The question of whether to expand the independent audit scope has become a priority among investor groups and standards setters. In its guidance on non-financial reporting, the International Corporate Governance Network states, “Independent assurance about the extent to which non-financial business reporting has followed established measurement and reporting standards can be useful to enhance the credibility and reliability of the reported information.”<sup>15</sup> The PCAOB’s concept release on the auditor’s reporting model solicits feedback on whether auditors should provide assurance on information outside the financial statements, such as the MD&A and non-GAAP measures.<sup>16</sup>

Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas expressed interest in the benefits of an expanded audit scope. For example, when asked if non-GAAP financial measures should be audited, Mr. Jonas said, *“If we were inventing the system from scratch, we would audit those numbers. Those measures are often important and investors rely on them as if they were audited. So yes, we would value auditor assurance of non-GAAP measures.”*

## Audit chairs can help their companies communicate a cohesive story to investors

Audit chairs agreed that the primary goal of financial reporting is to give investors a fair and accurate picture of how the company performed during the period under consideration. A member said, *“As the audit committee chair, I have only one objective: to tell shareholders – and by implication, other stakeholders – how it really is.”*

Yet while companies may be putting out valuable information – both audited and non-audited – about the company, what investors are really looking for is a cohesive story to “connect the dots” about company performance.<sup>17</sup> Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas highlighted several ways in which the audit committee can help their companies improve how they communicate with investors:

- **Continue to push for consistent messaging.** When analysts come across conflicting information from various company sources, it undermines their ability to appropriately value the company. Mr. Buesser said, *“My goal is to better understand your business model and financial objectives. It’s not reassuring when management gives a presentation saying the company’s goals are A, B, and C, and then I read the CD&A in the proxy and it says the company’s goals (for example, management’s compensation objectives) are D, E, and F. We try to link information across sources, like trade shows, conferences, and proxies.”* Mr. Jonas and Mr. Buesser emphasized that the audit committee should help ensure that these reports and communications do not present conflicting messages.
- **Ensure that reporting offers insight into how “key debates” may affect the company.** Mr. Jonas suggested companies should listen to the market and understand what investors are debating about the company when setting prices. He explained, *“We want to understand key debates as drivers of stock prices. We get as much information on those key debates as we can. For example, how will the Volcker*

<sup>15</sup> International Corporate Governance Network, *ICGN Statement and Guidance on Non-financial Business Reporting* (London: International Corporate Governance Network, 2008), 10.

<sup>16</sup> Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, *Concept Release*, 26.

<sup>17</sup> Ernst & Young and Tapestry Networks, *“The Financial Communication Challenge.”* 3.

*rule impact financial services companies, or what are certain financial institutions' exposures to sovereign government debt? ... Who will benefit from the tax holiday for the repatriation of dividends? These topics light up our phones."* Mr. Jonas suggested companies should ensure that their reporting informs analysts' views of key debates, which change over time.

- **Promote high-quality management communication of company performance.** Analysts value management's ability to place the numbers into a meaningful narrative about the company's strategy and performance, even if that narrative is "in part, a sales pitch."<sup>18</sup> Mr. Jonas said, *"For years, I've seen management presentations. They are in sharp contrast with the content of SEC filings – the presentations are top-down, clear, and include data, charts, and visuals. Too often the material in SEC filings lacks these positive features."* In addition, Mr. Buesser noted: *"I am surprised by the range of competence of our investor relations contacts. The majority of IR contacts know the requested number to a decimal point; however some (albeit a minority) cannot answer direct questions about the company. The former give me confidence."*
- **Consider speaking directly to investors in the case of a financial reporting problem.** While ACLN members have in the past questioned whether board directors should communicate directly with investors,<sup>19</sup> Mr. Jonas suggested it is crucial in the case of a financial reporting problem: *"I can't emphasize enough how great it is for investor confidence when the audit chair gets on the phone with us, or meets face to face, with an 'open kimono' objective. Audit committee chairs can help the company avoid a real crisis of confidence."*
- **Ensure the investor relations (IR) department engages in two-way communication with investors and with the audit committee.** For the investment community, the primary contact at a company is generally the head of the IR department.<sup>20</sup> Analysts and investors often have strong opinions on specific IR practices at different companies, offering commentary on such aspects as access to management, shareholder letters, and the IR website.<sup>21</sup> In conversation with Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas, a member asked, *"If we're a company whose financial statements are a 'C' or a 'D,' how do we get that feedback?"* Mr. Jonas responded, *"We suggest changes to the company's investor relations group. That said, it's likely difficult for a CFO to candidly discuss with the audit committee negative feedback from the sell side!"*

In addition, members discussed the possibility of closer contact with the IR staff as a source of insight for the audit committee into how well company reporting efforts are meeting the expectations of investors and what specific changes might be necessary. To build on the communication between IR and audit committees, Mr. Jonas suggested IR executives, controllers, and audit committee members should sponsor ongoing discussions with analysts to identify ways to improve specific disclosures.

<sup>18</sup> Ernst & Young and Tapestry Networks, ["The Financial Communication Challenge."](#) 6.

<sup>19</sup> Audit Committee Leadership Network, "Board-shareholder Communication," July 7, 2008.

<sup>20</sup> BNY Mellon, [Global Trends in Investor Relations - Sixth Edition: A Survey Analysis of IR Practices Worldwide](#) (New York: BNY Mellon, 2010), 55.

<sup>21</sup> ["Survey of IR Best Practice in the US."](#) *Inside Investor Relations*, February 18, 2011.

While many practical suggestions were raised during the discussion, members and guests acknowledged an inherent tension between companies and investors, given the differences in their objectives for financial reporting and the respective challenges they face. A member said to Mr. Buesser and Mr. Jonas, *“I sense both of your roles are to help the investor get ahead of the curve. That’s not a good use of our company resources. We live happily together, but I wonder if our different objectives will always cause this tension.”*

## Conclusion

With investor and analyst demand for more and better information about the companies they follow, and as companies seek to better explain their business model to the market, financial reporting will continue to improve. Audit chairs play a critical role in this dynamic – ensuring that company reports communicate a fair and accurate portrayal of the company, which may entail more significant changes, such as expanding the audit to include non-GAAP financial information and the MD&A. Moving forward, audit chairs may wish to seek more opportunities to engage in dialogue directly with analysts, in order to receive first-hand input on the current status of financial reporting and how to improve it.

### Buy- and sell-side analysts differ according to their unique roles in the market:

- **Sell-side analysts** work for brokerage houses, investment banks, or research organizations, providing insight and advice to buy-side analysts and investors. Mr. Jonas said, *“There are two types of sell-side analysts: those with an industry focus who cover specific companies and those who cover topics, such as macroeconomics, commodities, interest rates, investment strategy, accounting, and tax.”* Sell-side analysts publish research reports that are widely disseminated. They often appear in the media, commenting on companies, sectors or issues.
- **Buy-side analysts** work directly for investment decision-makers, such as pension-fund, hedge-fund, and asset managers, serving as the research function for their organizations by providing insight and advice exclusively for their use. Mr. Buesser said, *“The buy side typically follows more companies than the sell side. While sell-side analysts may cover five to 15 companies, buy-side analysts may cover 50 to 100 companies.”* Buy-side analysts will often use the analyses produced by sell-side analysts as they develop their own recommendations. Mr. Buesser said, *“The sell-side analysis is additive to what we do. For example, the sell side can add expertise on 30 different chemical products. They can tell us where the plants are being built. They add to our knowledge base quickly.”*



## About this document

The Audit Committee Leadership Network is a group of audit committee chairs drawn from leading North American companies committed to improving the performance of audit committees and enhancing trust in financial markets. The network is convened by Ernst & Young and orchestrated by Tapestry Networks to access emerging best practices and share insights into issues that dominate the new audit committee environment.

*ViewPoints* is produced by Tapestry Networks to stimulate timely, substantive board discussions about the choices confronting audit committee members, management, and their advisers as they endeavor to fulfill their respective responsibilities to the investing public. The ultimate value of *ViewPoints* lies in its power to help all constituencies develop their own informed points of view on these important issues. Anyone who receives *ViewPoints* may share it with those in their own network. The more board members, members of management, and advisers who become systematically engaged in this dialogue, the more value will be created for all.

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## Appendix 1: guest biographies

### Mr. Gary Buesser

Gary Buesser is a research analyst focusing on evolving and further enhancing Lazard's proprietary accounting validation work. Previously, Gary was a portfolio manager/analyst on Lazard's US strategic equity, US equity concentrated, and US mid cap equity portfolio teams. He began working in the investment field in 1983.

Prior to joining Lazard in 2000, Gary held positions at Evergreen Funds, SG Cowen, Shearson Lehman Brothers, and Kidder Peabody. He has an MBA in finance from the College of William & Mary and a BS in economics from St. Peter's College. Gary is a member of the New York Society of Security Analysts.

### Mr. Gregory J. Jonas

Gregory J. (Greg) Jonas is a managing director in Morgan Stanley's equity research group, covering matters involving accounting, financial reporting, and taxation. His goal is to improve the insight that analysts and investors glean from companies' public disclosure.

Greg came to Morgan Stanley from Moody's, where, during the credit crisis, he led the firm's communication functions. For five years, he was Moody's chief accountant on corporate ratings.

Greg joined Moody's from Arthur Andersen where he led the technical functions that supported Andersen's worldwide audit practice.

Greg has served on numerous committees supporting the AAA, AICPA, FASB, IASB, IMA, PCAOB, and SEC. During the 1980s, Greg served a two-year fellowship at the FASB.

Greg earned graduate and undergraduate degrees in accounting and finance from the University of Michigan.

## Appendix 2: participants

The following Audit Committee Leadership Network members, who sit on the boards of over 30 large-, mid-, and small-cap public companies between them, participated in all or part of the session:

- Denny Beresford, Fannie Mae and Legg Mason
- Les Brun, Merck
- Phil Hodkinson, BT\*
- Judy Richards Hope, General Mills and Union Pacific
- Marie Knowles, McKesson
- Mike Losh, Aon and TRW Automotive
- George Muñoz, Altria and Marriott International
- Oscar Munoz, United Continental Holdings
- Chuck Noski, Microsoft
- Bill Osborn, Caterpillar
- Pam Patsley, Texas Instruments
- Pierre Rodocanachi, Vivendi\*
- Peter Ueberroth, The Coca-Cola Company
- Steve West, Cisco Systems
- Chris Williams, Wal-Mart

\* Mr Hodkinson and Mr Rodocanachi are members of the European Audit Committee Leadership Network.

The following Ernst & Young partners participated in the meeting:

- Tom Hough, Americas Vice Chair of Assurance Services
- Steve Howe, Americas Managing Partner

### Appendix 3: discussion questions for audit committees

- ? What information do the analysts following your company value, and where do they obtain this information? Has this influenced your company's IR strategy?
- ? What concerns you about analysts' current use of financial reports? How do you feel about the balance between audited and non-audited information being used?
- ? What additional information do you think analysts need? Should that information be provided in the audited financial statements?
- ? What format or style changes can your company make to its financial reports that would help analysts?
- ? Do you believe the scope of the audit should be expanded, given the increasing use of non-GAAP financial information and other management information?
- ? Do you feel the audit committee should review a broader range of reported information?
- ? Does the audit committee provide any oversight of internal controls over non-financial information? If not, should this be addressed, and how?
- ? What kind of relationship do you have with the head of IR and other IR staff? How does the relationship need to evolve?
- ? How does the audit committee determine what analysts need? Should the audit committee go beyond IR to explore investor needs?